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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of institutional quality on the level of new
business formation in 26 of the former socialist states from 2006-2018. Using crosssectional and panel data, I find that the quality of a nation’s institutions, as measured by
the rule of law and control of corruption, has a statistically and economically significant
effect on the number of newly registered LLCs. Economies willing to improve their
institutional quality can expect more businesses start-ups to register in the formal
economy. Specifically, improving the control of corruption by one standard deviation is
associated with between 1.5 and 2.4 new businesses registered per 1,000 working age
people. Furthermore, I propose that institutional quality also influences an individual’s
decision whether to operate a new business start-up in the informal or formal sector.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strength and significance of the relationship
between institutional quality and new business registration in former socialist states. I build on
the work of North (1990) in highlighting the impact of institutional structures on economic
activity. In this paper, I focus on two consequential economic choices – the choice to start a new
business or not, and subsequently, the choice to operate in the formal or informal sector – and
ask: How do a country’s political institutions influence each of these decisions?
New business start-ups are crucial for the continued development of a modern market
economy. J.S. Metcalfe argues that the “dynamic of modern capitalism lies in the combinatorial
growth of knowledge and investment opportunities” (2004, 158). New business start-ups foster
this growth and innovation by disseminating best practice procedures and knowledge into the
market (Lafuente, Szerb and Zoltan 2016). Start-ups also fill gaps in the market and exert
competitive pressure on incumbent firms (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991).
The political and economic institutions within a given country will influence the
allocation of effort between and among activities in the formal and informal sector. Because
people have limited resources to allocate, I assume that individuals make their occupational
choices based on their calculations of the net costs and benefits associated with forming and
operating a new business start-up. When the perceived costs and benefits of a formal venture
outweigh the informal option, it can be expected that there will be a larger amount of formal
enterprises, and vice versa.
Political institutions set the balance of costs and benefits associated with different
economic activities by placing credible constraints on government behavior. In nations with
high-quality institutions, those who abuse power are quickly punished so the threat of
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expropriation and other abuses of privilege are mitigated. This helps to protect property rights
and ensure inclusive access to opportunity. When individuals feel secure under the prevailing
institutions, they will be more likely to secure the benefits of formal registration including the
ability to enter and enforce formal contracts and legally own and trade property (de Soto 2000).
In countries with poor-quality institutions, individuals often lack political freedoms and
any property rights granted are poorly protected. Thus, citizens will have little confidence in the
enforceability and predictability of economic transactions. This uncertainty may disincentivize
individuals from forming a new start-up and those that do may choose to “fly under the radar”
and open their business in the informal sector. As Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) note, “when
there are no checks on the state, on politicians, and on elites, private citizens do not have the
security of property rights necessary for investment” (953). Therefore, I hypothesize that the
quality of institutions, specifically the rule of law and control of corruption, will be positively
associated with the entry rate of new business start-ups in the formal economy.
Those who operate in the informal sector evade legislation and regulation, so many
informal economic activities are not declared. Therefore, the majority of this paper will focus on
new business start-ups for which there is data, those registered in the formal economy.
My analysis will focus on countries within Eastern Europe and Central Asia, specifically
the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics.1 During the socialist period, Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, and its satellite states, shared a similar national-federal structure which created a
unique institutional arrangement of ‘two-tiered socialism’. Although the socialist period ended in
the early 90s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1992, many of
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Data is collected on former Yugoslav republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia, and Slovenia, former Soviet Republics: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikstan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic and Slovakia, and former Satellite states: Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
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these states are still transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a free market. Thus
individuals must base their economic decisions on an institutional framework that is itself in
flux. This makes Eastern Europe and Central Asia a good empirical setting to test the interaction
between institutions and their impact on the formation of new business start-ups.
I begin by discussing the definition and importance of institutions broadly in section II.
The data used to test my hypothesis is detailed in section III. To perform the analysis, I employ
two measures of institutional quality, rule of law and control of corruption, from the World
Governance Indicators dataset, which annually reports the quality of political institutions in a
country. New business start-ups is measured using the number of newly registered LLCs per
1,000 working age people from the World Development Indicators dataset.
Section IV contains my empirical analysis. I begin by presenting and discussing scatter
plots of the relationship between business start-ups and my measures of institutional quality. I
find that higher rankings of institutional quality correspond to more new business start-ups. I
investigate this relationship in depth throughout the econometric analysis by estimating crosssectional and panel regressions. I find that institutional quality has a positive and significant
effect on the number of newly registered LLCs in an economy.
In Section V, I return to the notion of informality. First, informality is defined. Second,
estimates on the magnitude of the informal economy and informal start-up rates in the former
socialist states are given, which show that both are significant. Next, I elaborate on the role
institutions play in an individual’s decision of whether or not to register her business. Finally, I
highlight the impact informal employment has on the overall economy. Section VI concludes.
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II. INSTITUTIONS
i. Definition of institutions
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure
incentives in human exchange whether political, social, or economic” (North 1990, 3)
A few important aspects of institutions are emphasized in this definition. First, they are
“humanly devised,” meaning that the rules that govern a society are within human control and
created with specific objectives. Thus, institutions will operate to the benefit of their creators,
which is not always advantageous to the social welfare. For example, extractive institutions
allow a small ruling elite to extract wealth and resources from those living under them. While
profitable to the elite, these institutions are found to have long-term adverse effects on those
subjugated to them, including lower levels of investment and income (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001).
Second, institutions are the “rules of the game” that place “constraints” on individuals’
behavior. Individuals in a society must take the institutions as given and make political, social
and economic decisions accordingly. People adapt to the institutions and work within the
limitations given by these institutions to devise strategies that optimize the opportunities
provided. For example, in many of the former Soviet and socialist states, the institutions
constrained the formal economy giving rise to, in some countries, rather extensive, informal
economies to meet demand and overcome shortages from central planning.
Third, institutions’ principal effect will be through incentives. Incentives, or as William
Baumol (1990) states, “the structure of payoffs in an economy,” motivate people to pursue their
preferences and can encourage or discourage certain behavior. People weigh the costs and
benefits of different types of economic activities to determine which to engage in. One such
economic activity is investment. Baumol argues institutions that incentivize innovation and the
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production of goods and services will encourage productive investment or activities that
contribute positively to economic growth, like new business start-ups. Conversely, if the profits
from rent seeking or engaging in illegal activities that benefit the entrepreneur but not the
economy outweigh the risks and costs of doing so, unproductive and even destructive forms of
investment will dominate. Thus, the incentive structure plays a dominant role in the allocation of
resources in an economy.
This definition of institutions allows us to begin to understand how institutional quality
directly impacts the economic conditions of a nation. Although the term “new institutional
economics” was coined in 1975 by Oliver Williamson, economic theory has long attributed
differences in economic performance to the institutional structure of a society. For example, in
The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith notes the importance of private property rights, rule of law,
and the judiciary, laying the foundation for our modern understanding of institutions’ impacts on
economic prosperity. North and Weingast (1989) further examine the value of institutions and
argue that the government’s ability to commit credibly to upholding property rights is a main
determinent of economic development in England.
Empirical evidence corroborates the significant role the organization of a society plays in
shaping various economic outcomes like income levels (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001),
productivity (Hall and Jones, 1999), and entrepreneurial activity (Baumol, 1990, 1993; Acs et al.
2008). It was long hypothesized that geographic (e.g. Diamond 1997) or trade (e.g. Frankel and
Romer 1999) related factors could explain global income differences but the work of Rodrik,
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) substantiate the supremacy of institutions in determining
economic success. Kaufmann et al. also find “that there is a strong causal relationship from good
governance to better development outcomes such as higher per capita incomes, lower infant
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mortality, and higher literacy” (1999, 1). Given the consensus in the literature of the importance
of institutions, I hypothesize that greater institutional quality will accompany better economic
performance in the form of more business startups. I test my hypothesis in section V, but first I
emphasize a few significant aspects of good institutions.
ii. Good institutions
Good institutions secure and define property rights. Property is an expansive term which
includes both tangible assets such as capital, plot of land, or tools, and intangible assets such as
ideas and inventions. Property rights refer to the ownership of resources and grants owners the
ability to use their property how they chose and to collect the residual claims. The protection of
private property rights is essential for individuals to invest in private assets. As North and
Weingast highlight, “the more likely it is that the sovereign will alter property rights for his or
her own benefit, the lower the expected returns from investment and the lower in turn the
incentive to invest” (1989, 803).
Secure property rights protect against expropriation and predation from public and
private agents, such as confiscation of land by the government or theft of capital and other forms
of property by other individuals. Predation can be prevented by placing constraints on
government officials’ behavior that are enforced through an independent judicary. Effective
institutions feature well-defined property rights. This is best achieved by instituting enforceable
laws that outline the full liberties granted by owning a resource.
Institutions directly impact transaction costs, and thus, essentially set the price to conduct
business. “Transaction costs are the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie
exchange and therefore comprise all the costs of political and economic organization” (North
1984, 7). These costs include those to identify potential business opportunities and inputs, assess

6

the market to set appropriate prices, and negotiate and enforce implicit and explicit contracts
with vendors and customers. While forming new business relationships will never be void of
transaction costs, institutions reduce transaction costs borne by individuals by “reducing
uncertainty and establishing a stable structure to facilitate interactions” (Meyer 2001, 358).
James Madison highlights one of the main distinctions between good and bad institutions
in Federalist Paper No. 51, “in framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself” (1788). Good institutions check the
power of the governing class. Weak institutions are often altered to benefit those in power or
government officials renege on their commitment to uphold the institutions in place to satisfy
their personal needs or desires. Corruption or collusion by those with enforcement capabilities
weakens institutions. For this reason, strong institutions often incorporate a system of checks and
balances to prevent such activities, like an independent court system or well-defined process by
which rules and laws can be amended. In addition, strong institutions are able to adapt and
integrate new, relevant information to maintain successful governance throughout generations.
iii. Example of the effect of institutions on investment
As noted in the introduction, I am looking at the relationship between institutional quality
and new business start-ups. I have defined the importance of institutions and the qualities of
good institutions, but how do institutions affect business start-ups? To illustrate the relationship
between institutional quality and start-ups, I juxtapose the hypothetical career progression of
equally skilled builders. Damien works in a society with bad institutions. Gabriel works in a
society with good institutions.
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From an early age, Damien and Gabriel both showed a natural aptitude for construction,
building a kitchen table, bookshelf, or desk, useful items to help their families go about their day
to day activities. Both are ambitious and actively seek out opportunities to turn their skills into a
lucrative professional career. Where Gabriel lives, real estate is seen as a stable and profitable
investment. Many contract with builders to build personal homes or rental properties. Potential
owners can acquire loans from banks and the courts ensure that all involved parties uphold their
parts of the contract. Additionally, real estate values tend to increase overtime, providing riskadjusted returns to owners. However, where Damien lives, real estate is a risky investment due to
insecure property rights. The courts are unpredictable, often siding with the party who holds the
most political power, which is often purchased. High transaction costs and interest rates inhibit
reputable borrowers from getting loans from banks. Many live in government housing due to the
onerous practices required to acquire and secure private property.
With his skills, Gabriel soon becomes a licensed general contractor and decides to open
his own construction firm. He registers his company as a limited liability corporation (LLC),
receives a loan from a local bank to open a storefront and begins operations within a matter of
weeks. He hires a few employees to work under him paying them through payroll services. He
also pays federal and state taxes each year, thus contributing to the welfare of his community. He
rents out machinery and contracts with plumbers, electricians, welders, and many other
tradesmen to build new homes. His business quickly excels. He advertises his services across the
county and receives a plethora of high profile contracts to build grandiose residences. Given the
heavy workload, he expands his business and employs over 50 full-time employees. At the end
of his career, he transfers the ownership rights of his now million dollar corporation to his son
who will continue on the family legacy of crafting residential masterpieces.
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Without secure property rights, Damien takes a position working in the government and
retires his carpentry to that of a hobby. Soon Damien’s paycheck at the government agency does
not cover his bills and he needs a supplemental income. He begins building furniture for friends
and family, and soon opens a business in the informal economy. Despite his inability to
advertise, Damien expands his client base through word of mouth. Demand grows steadily for
his quality goods, and faced with an overwhelming variety of orders, he hires a few relatives to
work for him and pays them cash. He must keep his operation concealed to avoid detection by
the government who will surely extract his assets if made aware, so he only pays taxes on his
income from his government position and hides the remainder of his income in cash.
Careful to not draw notice from the exploitative auditors of his local government,
Damien finds himself unable to expand his business beyond that of a garage-based enterprise.
Eventually, though, he acquires enough capital to move out of his country in search of a land
with more secure property rights to pursue his dreams of becoming a homebuilder.2
While a fictional example, this highlights a few important consequences of institutional
quality. When individuals believe that their property rights are well defined and protected, they
become more inclined to engage in business ventures, especially those requiring a large sunk
investment. “Without property rights, individuals will not have the incentive to invest in physical
or human capital or adopt more efficient technologies” (Acs, et al. 2018, 505). Bad institutions,
those that facilitate corruption or a weak rule of law, often reward rent seekers while
disadvantaging producers thus crowding out firm creation. Lower property rights decreases
economic returns. Gabriel was able to reap high returns on his investment, leading him to start
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Across the Western Balkans, there is an exodus of educated and trained workers seeking to reap higher returns on
their skills elsewhere. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia, and Serbia suffer from the greatest brain
drain earning the Western Balkans the nickname ‘human capital exporters.’ (Vračić 2018)
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his own company, whereas Damien was only able to achieve enough of a return on his
investment to remove himself from participating in the oppressive institution’s economy at all.
Damien may have ultimately been as personally satisfied as Gabriel, but while Gabriel continues
to contribute to the formal economy, Damien’s departure removes at least one worker from the
formal economy, and eliminates his potential contributions to the welfare of his community.
Good institutions incentivize productive entrepreneurship. Gabriel was able to use his
skills to start his own company, knowing his contracts would be enforceable. Damien was
deterred from contracting with others due to the unreliable court system. When the threat of
expropriation is mitigated, individuals have more opportunities and incentives to make long-term
investments. However, where predation by public officials is common, people may choose to
invest elsewhere, as shown by Damien’s decision to leave the country.
The above discussion suggests that there will be a strong relationship between new
business start-ups and institutional quality. I build upon this notion and attempt to empirically
substantiate the importance of institutions to new firm creation in the former socialist states
located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. I focus on this set of countries due to their
comparable former institutional structures and shared history. Since the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, some countries have improved their institutions by undergoing vast
structural reforms, like Romania and Serbia.3 Other institutions, like Poland and Hungary, have
worsened. “In the case of Poland this occurred because of limited constitutional power and
frequent government changes, in Hungary, it is due to inconsistent policy making” (Horváth and
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Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia are
all EU countries. Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia are all candidate countries for the EU,
meaning that they are undergoing structural reforms, as a part of the accession process, to conform and align their
institutions with EU legislation. While EU membership does not necessitate higher quality institutions, the accession
process and membership can have a positive effect on the quality of institutions in these states.
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Kozenkow 2016). Some countries’ institutional quality has stagnated, neither declining or
improving, like Estonia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria. I empirically analyze the “Gabriels” in a
society, the individuals who are able to own, register, and operate a business in the formal
economy. Are the institutions within the former socialist states conducive to firm creation?

III. DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLES
I will use cross-sectional and panel data models to specify the relationship between
institutions and new firm creation in 26 of the former socialist states. To empirically estimate the
effect of the quality of institutions on new business start-ups I use measures of firm creation,
institutional quality, regulation to entry, and economic development. This section discusses the
principal variables and some of their limitations. A full description of the methodology used to
construct and report each variable and its sources is included in the appendix. Because data on
business start-ups is only available from 2006 onward, I focus on the years between 2006 and
2018. Turkmenistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina are excluded from the analysis due to the lack
of data on new businesses. 4
i. New business start-ups
My dependent variable is the number of new business start-ups per 1,000 working age
people. Collected from the World Bank’s Doing Business database, this variable captures new
business density in a country. It gives the gross new entry, meaning the number of newly
registered LLCs in a given year. The number of business start-ups is indicative of how many
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According to the World Bank “statistical capacity is a nation’s ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate highquality data about its population and economy” (2020). A country’s inability to provide statistics as a public good or
maintain effective statistical systems can reflect poor quality institutions. Data allows governments to make better
informed public-policy decisions and can enhance transparency and accountability. Therefore, a low statistical
capacity can reflect a desire to maintain discretionality.
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people in a society view operating an independently owned business in the formal economy as a
viable career option.
New firm start-ups are based on the number of newly formally registered businesses with
limited liability as the definition of these corporations is globally consistent making it a suitable
measure for cross-country analysis. 5 It is important to note that this measure has a few
drawbacks that may lead to the underreporting of the true number of start-ups. First, this measure
does not capture the total number of businesses operating in a country as the annual number of
closed businesses is not recorded. Second, all companies not of limited liability are excluded,
such as sole proprietorships and partnerships, due to differences in definition. However, for
many small business owners, LLC is an attractive choice of firm structure due to the flexibility
and protections offered, making this variable a useful proxy for formal firm registration of new
start-ups.
Most importantly, this measure’s coverage is limited to the formal sector due to the lack
of data on the number of businesses operating in the informal sector. The informal sector,
especially within the former Socialist states, is a significant component of the economy. The
informal economy, often stigmatized as the “black market” or characterized as illegal activity,
merely refers to unofficial or unregistered enterprises. The size of the informal sector varies
among countries, but it is estimated that 25 percent of the employed population engages in
informal employment in Europe and Central Asia (World Bank Group 2019). I expand upon the
significance and magnitude of informality in this region in section V, the case study.

5

Limited liability companies (LLC) refer to a firm structure for small business owners globally whereby the firm’s
owners and members, while the residual claimants, are legally separate from the firm. Personal assets of the firm’s
owners and shareholders will not be used to cover the debts and liabilities of the firm. There is no limit to the
number of shareholders an LLC can have and some countries only require one member, the owner, to incorporate
the business.
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ii. Institutional quality
My variable of interest is institutional quality. Institutions are deeply embedded within a
society and are much easier to capture theoretically than empirically. The importance of
institutions – the rules of the game – are widely acknowledged, although differences in
institutional quality across countries are difficult to measure.
To measure institutional quality, I will be using two aggregate measures that are a part of
the World Governance Index. This dataset was developed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and
Pablo Zoido-Labton in their paper “Governance Matters” (1999) to “measure subjective
perceptions regarding the quality of governance in different countries” (2). In association with
the World Bank, this dataset is updated annually.
The perception that predictable rules will govern society informs the decisions of relevant
parties including entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and denizens of a country. Economically
active people are less likely to invest where corruption is perceived to be high and the rule of law
weak (Wei 2000). The Rule of Law (law) and Control of Corruption (corrupt) indexes are
relevant proxies of institutional quality as “the confidence of residents of a country in these
institutions is required if they are to contribute to good governance” (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Zoido-Labton, Governance Matters 1999).6 Additionally, objective differences in governance
may not yield comparable measures for a cross country analysis. As Rodrik et al. explain
“institutional solutions that perform well in one setting may be inappropriate in other settings
without the supporting norms and complementary institutions” (2002, 22). Simply measuring
objective differences may distort what is truly happening within the countries.

6

Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Labton define governance “broadly as the traditions and institutions by which
authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and
replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”.
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Rule of law “measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society. These include perceptions on the incidence of both violent and non-violent
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts”
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Labton, Governance Matters 1999, 8). Control of corruption
measures the “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and
private interests” (8).
I use both the rank of a country’s quality of rule of law and control of corruption to
capture different aspects of good governance. However, unsurprisingly, the rule of law and
control of corruption variables are very highly correlated, 96.61 percent. A government who
exercises the rule of law more effectively is likely to have a greater ability to control corruption.
Additionally, citizens who lose trust in the government’s ability to control corruption are less
likely to trust the government’s ability to enforce contracts. It is expected that positive changes in
institutional quality will be associated with more business start-ups.
Measuring the practical effect of institutional quality is very difficult. Rule of law and the
control of corruption are only crude proxies of the multifaceted institutions that govern social,
political, and economic interactions. While the perceptions of institutional quality may change,
the actual institutions that govern may not. For example, citizens may perceive a reduction in
corrupt activities, while in reality, the same activities take place more covertly. In the next
section, empirical analysis, I attempt to estimate the magnitude of influence institutions have on
the decisions of economically active people.
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iii. Ease of starting a business
The primary variable I control for is the ease of starting a business. Studies on firm
creation are attentive to the regulatory environment potential owners face. Djankov et. al (2002),
Klapper et. al (2006), and Klapper and Love (2010), among others, find that the costs, days, and
procedures required to start a business are important predictors of the number of new firm
registrations. In particular, when the cost to register and operate a business decreases, individuals
who were previously burdened by regulation may be inclined to start a new business. Following
their work, I include the variable (Ease of Starting a Business) to capture the amount of
regulation in a country.
This indicator was developed by Djankov et. al (2002) and the World Bank (2003) as a
part of the Doing Business database to measure how efficiently an entrepreneur can legally open
and operate a business in a given country. Estimates of “the number of procedures that firms
must go through, the official time required to complete the process, and it’s official cost” are
gathered from five LLCs owned by married men and five LLCs owned by married women. In
this context, a procedure refers to all required interactions with third parties, like government
officials, to obtain the necessary licenses, permits, and approvals to officially run a business.
Thus, a one-step increase in Ease of Starting a Business alleviates a non-trivial burden to starting
a business.
This indicator is an informative measure of the regulation faced by individuals in this
study as the data is collected from LLC owners. While the principles embedded within Ease of
Starting a Business, may be indicative of institutional quality, there is a very weak linear
relationship between Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, indicated by a correlation
coefficient of 0.1678 and 0.1204 percent respectively. Rather than denoting the economic and
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financial institutions within a country this measure captures the cost of starting a business in the
formal economy.
iv. Economic Development
I control for economic development by including two covariates, GDP per capita and
human capital. Studies, such as Klapper and Love (2010) and Djankov et. al (2010), find that
more economically developed countries have a higher entry rate of new businesses in the formal
sector. Therefore, it is expected that countries with higher income levels and human capital
accumulation, will have more business start-ups in the formal economy. Expectedly, GDP per
capita is highly correlated to the rule of law and control of corruption measures, 83.87 and 80.38
percent respectively, meaning that changes in institutional quality are associated with shifts in
income levels and vice versa. This correlation can cause the effect of institutional quality to
become muddled, however, it is important to control for income as it is expected that more
wealth can stimulate more business start-ups.
Human capital refers to the amount of skills, experience, and knowledge people have
within an economy. A knowledgeable workforce can disseminate innovation within a community
or drive skilled individuals to capitalize upon their know-how by starting a business. Davidsson
and Honig (2003) substantiate the importance of education for young entrepreneurs and find that
formal education and experience both influence an individual’s decision to start a new business. I
control for education using the human capital index from Penn World Tables 9.1 which is “based
on average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) and an assumed rate of return to
education, based on Mincer equation estimates around the world” (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer
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2015). It is important to note that six of the former socialist countries do not have data on human
capital which restricts the analysis, when human capital is included, to 20 countries.7
Summary statistics for the cross-sectional dataset and are reported in table 1. Table 2
states the summary statistics for the panel dataset. I now turn to my empirical analysis. I use the
variables stated above to test my hypothesis that higher quality institutions will stimulate new
business start-ups to enter the formal economy.

IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, I will run a variety of regressions to best estimate the strength and
significance of the relationship between institutional quality and new business start-ups. Charts 1
and 2 illustrate the relationship between new business startups and institutional quality, as
measured by rule of law and control of corruption respectively. This is consistent with my
hypothesis that higher institutional quality will correspond to more business start-ups. To test my
hypothesis econometrically, I first perform a cross-sectional analysis, treating each country as a
single observation, to analyze the average effect of each variable on the number of business startups in former socialist states between 2006 and 2018. Next, I set up my data as a panel and run a
fixed effects estimation to capture the contemporaneous relationship between new business startups and institutional quality.

7

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Montenegro, Republic of North Macedonia, Uzbekistan are excluded due to lack of
data on human capital.
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i. Cross-Section
The cross-sectional model presented in this paper assumes that new business start-ups lead to
economic growth and seeks to specify only the relationship between institutions and new firm
creation. The cross-sectional model is specified in equation 1:
NewBusinessStart-upsi = b1InstitutionalQualityi +b2 EaseofStartingaBusinessi + b3GDPi +
(1)
b4 HumanCapitali + b5 RegionalDummyi + α + εi
NewBusinessStart-upsi denotes the average number of new LLCs per 1,000 working age people
for country i. The parameter α is the intercept and the mean zero error term are denoted by εi. I
average each variable for the years 2006 – 2018. In other words, the model examines how the
quality of institutions, regulations on business start-ups and other factors affect new business
start-ups over the twelve-year time period. Averaging each variable minimizes year-to-year
variation and provides a picture of the long-term relationship between new business start-ups,
institutional quality and the other covariates.
As previously stated, institutional quality is difficult to measure so I will employ two
variables, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption to capture institutions in a country. To avoid
problems due to multicollinearity, I test each measure of institutional quality on new business
startups separately. I start by regressing the institutional quality variables alone. Column 1 in
table 3 and 4 report the results when rule of law and control of corruption are regressed on new
business startups. The effect of institutional quality on the number of new LLCs registered in an
economy is statistically significant and of similar magnitude regardless of the measure
institutional quality. Consistent with my predictions, improvements in institutional quality are
associated with greater firm creation. A country with a positive one standard deviation change in
institutional quality, whether measured by Rule of Law or Control of Corruption, is associated
with approximately two additional LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people.
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Of course, other things affect new business start-ups. The second specification, reported in
column 2, controls for the cost of registering a business by including the score indicating the
difficulty of starting a business in a given country, Ease of Starting a Business. Remember that a
larger score on this index means less government regulation to enter the formal economy. The
estimated coefficient on ease of starting a business is positive, statistically significant, and of
considerable magnitude when regressed with institutional quality. A country with a one standard
deviation improvement in the efficiency of registering a business in the formal economy is
associated with approximately one new LLC registered per 1,000 working age people. These
results align with my expectations, less regulation to entry allows new business startups to enter
the formal economy.
To control for the country’s development, the third specification adds GDP per Capita and
Human Capital. Finally, I include dummy variables for each of the former regime types, Soviet,
Satellite, Yugoslavia, to control for shared history, internal trade patterns, stability, and other
regional characteristics. Results are reported in columns 3 and 4 respectively. None of these
variables have statistical significance. However, the addition of these variables does not reduce
the magnitude on the coefficients of institutional quality, on the contrary, the coefficients on both
rule of law and control of corruption actually increase. On average, if a country’s ability to
control corruption increases by one standard deviation, there will be approximately 2.8 new
LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people, when all variables are controlled for.
The effect of institutional quality on new business start-ups is statistically and economically
significant in all eight specifications. The fact that the magnitude of the coefficient on rule of law
and control of corruption does not decrease with the addition of variables indicates that the
relationship between institutional quality and firm creation is stable. However, this model has a
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few drawbacks. The cross-sectional model can be problematic for countries whose economies
have dramatically changed over this time span, as variation within countries is averaged out.
Additionally, there are many unobservable differences across countries that the regime dummy
variables do not capture, like cultural and business practices, that could influence individuals in
their decision to register and operate an LLC. I will further parse out the effect of institutional
quality on new business start-ups by running a fixed effects model using panel data.
ii. Fixed Effects
The cross-sectional results are consistent with the model’s prediction. To further test my
hypothesis, I use a panel dataset. This approach allows me to analyze the relationship between
institutional quality and new business start-ups over time. While I include dummy variables to
control for regional effects, the cross-sectional model may suffer from omitted variable bias due
to unobservable characteristics that are correlated with new business start-ups such as business
practices or attitudes toward entrepreneurial activities. With a fixed effects model, omitted
variable bias is less of a concern because many factors not controlled for in the cross-sectional
analysis are picked up by the inclusion of dummy variables for each country.
The main advantage and disadvantage of this approach is that it excludes time invariant
characteristics. To accurately estimate the effect of institutional quality on new business start-ups
there must be sufficient variation in institutional quality over time. This may seem paradoxical as
institutions are persistent and evolve slowly. However, as charts 3 and 4 show, many of the
former socialist states do see changes in trends of institutional quality from 2006 to 2018, such as
Hungary and Belarus. Furthermore, countries that exhibit institutional changes will have greater
influence on the estimates than countries whose institutional quality remains steady.
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To capture the contemporaneous relationship between new business start-ups and
institutional quality I run a fixed effects model, specified in equation 2:
NewBusinessStart-upsit = b1InstitutionalQualityit +b2 Start-upRegulationit + b3GDPit + (2)
b4 HumanCapitalit + αi + εit

NewBusinessStart-upsit denotes the average number of new LLCs per 1,000 working age people
for country i in year t. The parameter α is the intercept and the mean zero error term is denoted
by εit. As in the cross-sectional model, I will first regress the number of new business start-ups
with each measure of institutional quality as the sole independent variable. Results are reported
in column 1 of tables 5 and 6.
Consistent with my hypothesis, institutional quality has a significant effect on the number
of newly registered LLCs when both rule of law and control of corruption are used to measure
institutions. When a country improves their rule of law ranking by one standard deviation there is
a positive association with roughly 1.4 new LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people.
Unlike in the cross-sectional model, a country’s ability to control corruption has a much higher
effect on new business start-ups. A positive improvement by one standard deviation in a
country’s control of corruption ranking is associated with approximately 2.4 new LLCs
registered per 1,000 working age people.
I now detail the principal findings when the other covariates are included. Estimates are
stated in column 2 and 3. The inclusion of Ease of Starting a Business reduces the explanatory
power of the rule of law measure significantly where a one standard deviation improvement is
associated with less than 0.5 new LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people. When control
of corruption is used to measure institutional quality, the inclusion of Ease of Starting a Business
decreases the magnitude of the coefficient but the estimate remains economically significant. A
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one standard deviation improvement in the control of corruption ranking is associated with
roughly 2.3 new LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people.
Moving to the third specification, the addition of proxies for economic development
further diminishes the explanatory power of institutional quality. The coefficient on Rule of Law
becomes negative although its magnitude is reduced by a similar amount as in the second
specification, suggesting that there is not enough variation in the rule of law measure to
accurately estimate its effect on new business start-ups. GDP per capita is statistically significant
although it has a nominal effect on new business start-ups regardless of the measure of
institutional quality. The control of corruption holds statistical and economic significance when
all variables are included in the model. A one standard deviation increase in the control of
corruption ranking is associated with 1.5 new LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people.
Human capital and the ease at which an individual can start a business in a given economy both
have a positive but individually insignificant effect on new business start-ups regardless of the
measure of institutional quality used.
iii. Summary of results
The quality of institutions plays an important role in the development of new business
start-ups in the former socialist states. All of the estimated coefficients for each measure of
institutional quality in both the cross-sectional and fixed effects models are statistically
significant. With one exception, rule of law in the final version of the fixed effects model, the
coefficients on institutional quality are all positive. Further, again with the exception of rule of
law in the fixed effects model, a one standard deviation increase in institutional quality has an
economically significant effect on new business start-ups. The estimated coefficients for
institutional quality in the cross-sectional model are more stable than the estimates in the fixed
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effects model. I attribute this to differences in model specification, averaging each variable
removes year-to-year variation and could yield more stable estimates. Also, insufficient variation
in institutional quality could lead to unstable estimations in the fixed effects model.
Human capital is statistically insignificant in every regression. The ease at which
individuals can start a business is only statistically significant in the cross-sectional model and in
only half of the regressions. GDP per capita is only statistically significant in the fixed effects
model. Insignificance can be explained for a few reasons. First, improvements leading to less
regulation or greater human or physical capital accumulation may take a few years to take effect.
Given the small-time frame of 12 years, the effect may not be fully discernible within this
framework. Second, this analysis only covers 26 countries, expanding the dataset to include more
countries, and thus more observations, would increase the accuracy of the estimates. Overall,
insignificance does not mean that these measures do not have an effect on an individual’s
decision to register a new LLC but rather that the data is not sufficient to make a conclusion
about the effect on new business start-ups. Overall, the results of these regressions support my
hypothesis that institutional quality has a positive effect on the number of new business start-ups
in a country.
The empirical analysis presented in this paper utilizes available data on new business
start-ups registered in the formal economy. However, one cannot understand the full economic
and institutional conditions of the former socialist states without considering the informal
economy. “The informal economy was an essential part of the former communist economies and
is now an important part of the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe” (Wallace
and Latcheva 2006, 84). In these nations, under central planning, shortages of necessary goods
were commonplace and the informal economy arose to meet demand. Without data on firms in
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the informal economy, the empirical analysis is limited in portraying a full picture of new
business start-ups in the region. In the next section, I elaborate upon the definition and
determinants of informality as well as the relationship of the informal economy to the formal.

V. A LOOK INTO THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
There is an innumerable amount of decisions required to register and operate an LLC.
Chief among those, the decision to run a business or not and, subsequently, the decision to
register the business or not. Those living in a country with secure and well-defined property
rights may not consider the decision to register their business or not, preferring the protection of
the law. However, in some former socialist states “many firms chose to operate in the informal
sector to avoid burdensome regulations, taxation or corruption” (Okawa 2019, 76). Others may
choose to test out their start-up in the informal sector to determine if their business is profitable
enough to undertake the cost of registration.
This section begins with a definition of informality. Then, estimates on the size of the
informal economy and informal start-up rates in the former socialist states are given. Next, I
explore how the quality of institutions influence the decision among nascent business owners to
operate in the informal or formal sector. Finally, I briefly discuss the impact informal
employment has on the economy.
i. Definition of informality
The informal economy is sometimes referred to as the “black market” or “shadow
market” and is kept “underground.” There is a lack of consensus within the literature on the
definition of informality. In this paper, I utilize a definition of informality that aligns with the
new institutional economics classification system. According to Edgar L. Feige, “the informal
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economy comprises those economic activities that circumvent the costs and are excluded from
the benefits and rights incorporated in laws and administrative rules covering property
relationships, commercial licensing, labor contracts, torts, financial credit and social security
systems” (1990, 992). 8 Therefore, individuals who evade the established ‘rules of the game’ that
govern economic activity or whose activities are denied protection of those rules are agents in
the informal economy.
ii. Size of the Informal Economy in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Measuring informality is quite elusive. Individuals risk penalties for evading institutional
regulations so many conceal their work to avoid detection. This penchant for concealment makes
informality difficult to analyze empirically.
I use direct estimates from an International Labor Organization (ILO) report on
informality, Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A statistical picture. The ILO used
criteria developed by global policy experts to differentiate between informal and formal
employment and derive employment figures based on national household surveys. In Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, many individuals hold multiple jobs simultaneously. Such as Damien
from our previous example: he held a governmental position in the formal economy while
operating a carpentry business in the informal sector from his garage. To account for multiple
job-holdings I employ a job-based measure of informal employment.
Informal economies vary in size and visibility. It is estimated that 41.3 percent of total
employment in Central Asia and 31.5 percent in Eastern Europe was informal in 2016. The
magnitude of informality varies significantly among each region. Table 7, from the ILO’s report

8

Feige argues that “there is no single underground economy; rather, there are many.” He continues, “different types
of underground activities are distinguished according to the particular institutional rules that they violate” (1989,
991). In this paper, informal transactions are legal activities but are not declared for tax, labor law, etc. purposes.
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on informality, reports the distribution of informal employment within the informal sector,
formal sector, and household sector. Eastern Europe and Central Asia each have a greater
incidence of informality then the regional average. Tajikistan and Albania have the highest share
of informal employment in the overall economy at 74.8 and 61.0 percent respectively while
Slovenia, Estonia, and Czech Republic each have shares in the single digits.
In the former socialist states “state officials and enterprise managers are often linked to
nonstate activities and firms to operate more flexibly and generate ‘private income’ flows”
(Kaufmann and Kaliberda 1996, 6). Most notably, Eastern Europe has the largest share of
informal employment in the formal sector at 9.5 percent. Informal employment in the formal
sector includes all positions that “labor legislation does not specifically cover” which can include
part-time or temporary work and many subcontracting arrangements (Hussmanns 2004, 6). This
type of informality is often only partially undeclared, such an employee who is reported to work
part-time but in actuality, works full-time. This definition also covers situations in which
employees are officially paid a portion of their salary while the remainder is paid in cash ‘tax
free’.
Across Europe and Central Asia, employees represent the largest group of those
operating in the informal economy. Informal employment refers to transactions that are lawful in
nature but not reported or declared to government officials. This type of work excludes
employees from employment benefits like severance pay, sick leave, or social security pensions.
Further, a 2011 study finds that informal self-employment is generally more prevalent informal
wage employment across all former socialist states included in the analysis, except Russia and
Latvia (Hazans) (Table 8). It is evident that the informal sector is a significant facet of the
economies in the former socialist states.
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Data on informal business start-ups is less available than on informality as a whole. Some
Informal start-ups rates refers to the proportion of individuals who, based on their calculations on
the perceived costs and benefits, choose to operate in the informal sector rather than the formal.
Table 9 reports estimates of informal start-up rates, expressed as the number of new business
entries per 100 adult-age population, for 13 former socialist states from Autio and Fu (2014).9
Kazakhstan, North Macedonia, and Serbia have the highest informal start-up rates. Further, they
find a negative correlation between formal and informal start-up rates; where informal start-up
rates are high, formal start-up rates tend to be low. In Poland, for example, it is estimated that
there are sixteen unregistered businesses operating in the informal economy for every new
formal business start-up. “This points to a substitution effect in the entrepreneur’s choice
between whether or not to register his business, a choice which is affected by economic and
institutional conditions” (OECD 2015, 7).
iii. Relationship between formal and informal economies
The informal and formal economy are linked together by the institutions of a country. As
stated previously, individuals will decide whether to register their business start-up or not
depending on the costs and benefits of doing so. Institutions “determine the evolution and
composition of the formal and informal sectors” by setting the price of conducting economic
activities in the form of transaction costs (Feige 1990, 990). Individuals in each sector face
different transaction costs based on the institutional rules they adhere to or circumvent.
Individuals may chose informal employment options to avoid the higher costs of
complying with onerous regulations in the formal economy including an abundance of time-

9

Informal start-up rates are estimated through an econometric model where the total start-up rate derives from the
GEM and the informal start-up rates is the simple difference between total estimate and formal start-up rates based
on the World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey Dataset.
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intensive procedures to start a business and register property. Other individuals, like hairdressers
or caretakers, may choose to evade licensing requirements by working in the informal sector.
While seemingly straightforward, in reality, the relationship between the formal and informal
sector can be quite convoluted, especially in the former socialist states where “the state sector is
rather active in unofficial activities” (Kaufmann and Kaliberda 1996, 6).
Charts 5 and 6 depict the relationship between the rule of law and control of corruption
ranking and the estimated share of informal employment in each country for which there is data
in 2016.10 The charts show that higher quality institutions are associated with smaller informal
economies. Stronger, more reliable institutions grant business owners economic stability and
higher expected gains to registering their operations while weaker, corrupt institutions lack the
protections and incentives business owners require to entrust their investments to those who
govern the formal economy.
Governments also create barriers to enter the formal economy by requiring individuals to
comply with labor and market regulations. “An important reason why many of these permits and
regulations exist is probably to give officials the power to deny them and to collect bribes in
return for providing the permits” (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 601). Institutions also may impose
direct costs on firms such as high tax rates, mandatory social security contributions and
payments to corrupt officials. Those who do not register their business can make extra profits
through lower start-up costs and tax evasion. Widespread corruption can also influence
businesses to enter the informal economy to avoid predatory behavior, such as bribes and
extortion, at the hands of government officials.

10

I use the share of total informal employment instead of informal start-up rates to include more countries.
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If the government cannot credibly commit to the institutions in place, there may be only
trivial benefits to formally registering business activities as the courts are unable to enforce
contracts or protect private property rights. “A weak judiciary system, excessive bureaucracy,
lack of transparency, and directed credit to connected borrowers and strategic enterprises
exacerbate the incentives to informality” (Abdih and Medina 2013, 7). Further, uncertainty about
future institutional changes can increase the likelihood that individuals will operate in the
informal sector where they rely on personal networks and reputation to enforce contracts and
protect their property rights.
iv. The impact of informality in the economy
While all businesses, whether formal or informal, directly benefit the wellbeing of its
owners by allowing them to generate personal income, only businesses operating within the
formal economy contribute to the overall economic growth of a nation through taxes, social
security contributions and more. Tax evasion results in lower tax revenues that compromise the
government’s ability to provide social programs and invest in infrastructure. Insufficient
spending can inhibit those most in need of such programs from receiving assistance. A recent
study finds that informality is associated with “lower, less durable economic growth and greater
financial instability” (Georgieva 2019). Operators of informal businesses face limited
possibilities of individual wealth accumulation and business growth, as their need to remain
under the government’s radar necessitates small-scale operations (in most cases).

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the impact of institutional quality on the level of new business
formation in 26 of the former socialist states from 2006-2018. Using cross-sectional and panel
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data, I find that the quality of a nation’s institutions, as measured by the rule of law and control
of corruption, has a statistically and economically significant effect on the number of newly
registered LLCs. Economies willing to improve their institutional quality can expect more
businesses start-ups to register in the formal economy. Specifically, improving the control of
corruption by one standard deviation is associated with between 1.5 and 2.4 new businesses
registered per 1,000 working age people. However, my empirical analysis is only able to capture
the growth of the formal economy, which may exclude a far greater amount of startups existing
outside the bounds of available data, due to their existence in the informal economy.
Institutions govern the allocation of resources throughout the economy and determine the
cost of economic exchange by establishing the incentive and payoff structure. In turn, people
adapt to the rules of the game and work within the limitations given by these institutions to
devise strategies that optimize the opportunities provided. The number of new business start-ups
captures the view that operating an independent business in the formal economy is a profitable
investment and is influenced by the presiding institutional arrangement.
Potential business owners become more inclined to declare employment and invest in
official activities when the costs to comply with formal institutions are low and property and
economic rights are secure. “When profits or potential profits are taken away from firms through
regulation, taxation, or corruption, entrepreneurs choose not to start firms or expand less rapidly
than they might otherwise” (Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer 1997, 160). Further, overwhelming
transaction costs and weak enforcement capabilities can impede firm creation in the formal
sector and drive workers and entrepreneurs into the informal economy. As institutional quality
increases, so should the opportunities in the formal sector and, inversely, the amount of
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businesses in the informal sector should decrease as their operators migrate into more legitimate
market spheres.
An informal operation may be a stepping stone to a formal business start-up, i.e.
individuals who start their business in the informal sector later register in the formal economy.
Many countries are already working with organizations, including the ILO and OECD, to create
national formalization strategies that will help facilitate the transition to the formal economy.
Many of these policies are aimed at improving the institutional framework and reducing the
barriers to business by simplifying entry regulations, reforming stringent labor market
regulations, and reducing the tax burden.
This study contributes to literature that finds that strengthening the rule of law and
tackling corruption is associated with better economic outcomes, such as more business start-ups
in the formal economy and a lower incidence of informality.
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Table 1: Variable Summary Statistics for Cross Sectional Data
Variable
Observations
New LLC Firm
Registration
26
Rule of Law
26
Control of Corruption
26
Ease of Starting a
Business
26
GDP per capita
26
Human Capital
20

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum Maximum

3.7556
48.4316
45.0791

3.4354
24.0782
23.8176

0.3257
8.9662
9.51

15.4498
86.0177
84.0177

84.4260
15,475.18
3.2486

5.6882
6,886.555
0.1880

69.8538
3,087.595
2.9143

94.4231
27,213.15
3.6523
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Table 2: Variable Summary Statistics for Panel Data
Variable
New LLC Firm
Registration
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
Ease of Starting a
Business
GDP per capita
Human Capital

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

323
338
338

3.8146
48.4316
45.0791

3.6492
24.0042
23.8049

0.0627
3.76
3.79

23.5931
88.04
89.9

329
312
240

84.2581
15,475.18
3.2486

10.2557
7,088.321
0.2008

25.5
2,045.375
2.878

97.8
31,140.9
9.79379
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Table 3: Cross- sectional regression results
OLS regressions, where rule of law measures institutional quality
New LLC Registrations
per 1,000 working age adults

Variable
Name

Iterations
2nd
0.0833***
(0.0220)

3rd
0.0879*
(0.0464)

4th
0.0973*
(0.0494)

0.1690*
(0.0933)

0.1999
(0.1237)

0.1686
(0.1407)

start_bus

GDP per capita

-0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0000
(0.0001)

gdp_pc

Human Capital Index

1.7960
(5.0675)

1.3320
(5.2952)

hc

2.4318
(2.2388)

ussr

omitted

yugoslavia

1.3706
(2.2286)

satellite

_cons

Rule of Law

1st
0.0882***
(0.0229)

Ease of Starting a Business

Former Soviet Socialist State
Former Yugoslavian
Socialist Republic
Satellite State of the Soviet
Union

constant
observations
Adjusted R-squared

-0.5172
(1.2132)

-14.5516*
(7.8341)

-22.4112
(20.3991)

-20.9673
(22.1558)

26
0.3566

26
0.4125

20
0.2834

20
0.2425

Standard errors are given in parentheses
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
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law

* significant at the 10% level

Table 4: Cross-sectional regression results
OLS regressions, where control of corruption measures institutional quality
New LLC Registrations
per 1,000 working age adults

Variable
Name

Iterations
2nd
0.0872***
(0.0217)

3rd
0.0965**
(0.0434)

4th
0.1192**
(0.0455)

0.1751*
(0.0908)

0.2209*
(0.1194)

0.1804
(0.1288)

start_bus

GDP per capita

-0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0001
(0.0002)

gdp_pc

Human Capital Index

2.1860
(4.9012)

1.6513
(4.8822)

hc

5.7598
(4.5198)

ussr

omitted

yugoslavia

1.8945
(2.0531)

satellite

_cons

Control of Corruption

1st
0.0914***
(0.0228)

Ease of Starting a Business

Former Soviet Socialist State
Former Yugoslavian
Socialist Republic
Satellite State of the Soviet
Union

constant
observations
Adjusted R-squared

-0.3656
(1.1562)

-14.9610
(7.6492)

-24.8683
(19.7595)

-23.4443
(20.4136)

26
0.3768

26
0.4402

20
0.3322

20
0.3565

Standard errors are given in parentheses
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
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corrupt

* significant at the 10% level

Table 5: Panel data regression results
Fixed effect regressions, where rule of law measures institutional quality
New LLC Registrations
per 1,000 working age adults
Rule of Law

Iterations
1st
0.0582***
(0.0184)

Ease of Starting a Business

2nd
0.0196***
(0.0208)

3rd
-0.0660**
(0.0260)

0.0125
(0.0172)

0.0007
(0.0109)

GDP per capita

0.0002***
(0.0000)

Human Capital Index

constant
observations
groups
R-sq. within
R-sq. between
rho
Prob > F
F test all u_i = 0 Prob >F

Variable Name

start_bus

gdp_pc

1.5139
(1.3801)

hc

_cons

0.9604
(0.9054)

0.2212
(1.0442)

-1.7197
(4.1777)

323
26
0.0327
0.3831
0.8057
0.0017
0.0000

314
26
0.0448
0.3950
0.8052
0.0014
0.0000

221
20
0.1524
0.0002
0.9091
0.0000
0.0000

Standard errors are given in parentheses
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
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law

* significant at the 10% level

Table 6: Panel data regression results
Fixed effect regressions, where control of corruption measures institutional quality
New LLC Registrations
per 1,000 working age adults

Iterations
2nd
0.0978***
(0.0176)

3rd
0.06316**
(0.0264)

0.0123
(0.0092)

0.0029
(0.0110)

start_bus

GDP per capita

0.0001**
(0.0001)

gdp_pc

Human Capital Index

1.6442
(1.3830)

hc

_cons

Control of Corruption

1st
0.1010***
(0.0167)

Variable Name

Ease of Starting a Business

constant
observations
groups
R-sq. within
R-sq. between
rho
Prob > F
F test all u_i = 0 Prob >F

-0.8202
(0.7710)

-1.7900*
(1.0037)

-7.0958*
(4.2629)

336
26
0.1097
0.3999
0.8050
0.0000
0.0000

314
26
0.1163
0.4085
0.8000
0.0000
0.0000

221
20
0.1495
0.3126
0.8621
0.0000
0.0000

Standard errors are given in parentheses
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
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corrupt

* significant at the 10% level

Table 7: Share of Informal Employment in Total Employment (%)
Country
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Armenia
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Hungary
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovakia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Serbia
Slovenia

Total
48.6
74.8
52.1
15.9
9.2
12.2
28.9
38.0
28.9
35.9
16.7
6.9
13.2
12.6
61.0
30.1
13.0
22.1
5.0

In the
In the
In
informal
formal
households
sector
sector
37.2
9.6
1.8
54.4
14.4
5.9
39.2
1.4
11.6
15.0
0.9
0.0
8.6
0.6
0.4
11.8
0.4
0.0
21.9
6.6
0.0
20.1
17.8
0.0
27.4
1.5
0.4
24.4
11.5
0.0
16.4
0.3
0.0
5.4
1.5
0.0
11.2
2.0
0.0
8.2
4.4
0.0
29.1
0.5
31.4
30
0.1
0.0
12.8
0.2
0.0
6.4
10.7
5.0
4.8
0.3
0.0
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Table 8: Informal Employment in 12 former socialist states, 2008-2009
(% of total informal employment)
Country
Estonia
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Hungary
Slovakia
Latvia
Lithuania
Slovenia
Poland
Romania
Russia
Ukraine

Informal Wage
Employment
3.2
5.3
1.3
2.6
1.2
3.7
2.2
6.2
4.1
5.1
6.1
6.9

Informal Self-Employment
6.3
6.7
10.7
6.2
11.0
3.6
4.2
7.2
16.6
5.9
5.4
7.3
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Table 9: Informal Start-up Rates in 13 former socialist states, 2001-2010
Number of new business entries per 100 adult age population
Country

Informal Start-up Rate

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Czech Republic
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Montenegro
North Macedonia
Poland
Romania
Russia
Serbia
Slovenia

0.65
0.32
0.33
0.57
1.42
0.5
0.58
1.11
0.8
0.35
0.34
0.85
0.27
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Number of new LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people

Chart 1: New business start-ups and rule of law

Rule of law ranking
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Number of new LLCs registered per 1,000 working age people

Chart 2: New business start-ups and control of corruption

Control of corruption ranking
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Chart 3: Rule of law ranking from 2006 to 2018
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Chart 4: Control of corruption ranking from 2006 to 2018
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Chart 5: Share of total employment that is informal and rule of law ranking in 2016
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Chart 6: Share of total employment that is informal and control of corruption ranking in
2016
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Variable Explanations:
New LLC Registration Density (new_llc_pw): From the World Development Index, the
number of new limited liability companies registered in the calendar year per 1,000 people ages
15-64. Serves to proxy the density of business in a country given the lack of data on the total
number of businesses operating in a country.
Rule of Law Index (law): From the World Governance Index, a measure of relevant parties’
perceptions that predictable rules will govern social and economic decisions in a society. Annual
data is collected from an average of 15 data sources including surveys of households and firms,
experts, non-governmental organizations, and public sector organizations. Reported by the
percentile rank, which indicates the country’s score relative to all countries covered by the
indicator, from 0 to 100 with larger values indicating better governance.
Control of Corruption (corrupt): From the World Governance Index, a measure of how well a
country controls corruption. Annual data is collected from an average of 15 data sources
including surveys of households and firms, experts, non-governmental organizations, and public
sector organizations. Reported by the percentile rank, which indicates the country’s score relative
to all countries covered by the indicator, from 0 to 100 with larger values indicating better
governance.
Ease of Starting a Business (start_bus): From the Doing Business dataset, a measure of how
efficiently an individual can start up and formally operate an LLC in a given economy. An
economy’s score is generated using data on the number of formally required procedures, the time
and cost needed to comply with each procedure, and the paid-in minimal capital requirement.
Data is based upon responses and research of all publicly available information on two types of
LLCs, five companies owned by married men and five companies owned by married women.
Scores are computed by averaging the scores collected for each of the components. The overall
score for starting a business is calculated in the same fashion using the score of each indicator in
an economy. Local experts, including government officials and lawyers, review and confirm the
results.
Human Capital Index (hc): From Penn World Tables, a measure of human capital stock in a
country based on the average years and return rate of schooling. The Human Capital Index
measures the amount of human capital a child born today could expect to attain by age 18 and “is
based on average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) and an assumed rate of return to
education, based on Mincer equation estimates around the world from Psacharopoulos (1994)”
(Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015).
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Real GDP per capita (gdp_pc): From Penn World Tables, output side real GDP per capita in
PPP in 2011 USD. Measures the productive capacity of an economy by including quality
adjusted prices of exports and imports.
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia): Dummy variable, 1 if state was formerly a part of the Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia, 0 otherwise.
U.S.S.R. (ussr): Dummy variable, 1 if state was a former Soviet Socialist Republic, 0 otherwise.
Satellite State (satellite): Dummy variable, 1 if state was formerly a satellite state of the Soviet
Union, 0 otherwise.
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